Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
3-2012

Trial Selection Theory and Evidence
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law

Haizhen Lin
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory and Evidence , in Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics: Procedural Law and Economics 487 (C.W. Sanchirico ed., 2nd 2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/188

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open
access by Scholarly Commons at Boston University
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
For more information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

TRIAL SELECTION THEORY AND EVIDENCE: A REVIEW
Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 09-27
(May 20, 2009)
Keith N. Hylton
Haizhen Lin
Revised June 8, 2009

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2009.html

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407557

TRIAL SELECTION THEORY AND EVIDENCE: A REVIEW

Keith N. Hylton∗
Haizhen Lin**

April 2009

Forthcoming in, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Volume X: Procedural
Law and Economics, edited by Chris Sanchirico, Edward Elgar Publishing)

Abstract: Trial selection theory consists of models that attempt to explain or predict the
characteristics that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that settle,
and the implications of those characteristics for the development of legal doctrine and for
important trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate. This paper presents a
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then present a model that includes Priest-Klein and asymmetric information theories as
special cases. We conclude with a review of the empirical evidence.
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I. Introduction

This paper presents a review of trial selection theory. We use the term “trial
selection theory” to refer to models that attempt to explain or predict the characteristics
that distinguish cases that are litigated to judgment from those that settle, and the
implications of those characteristics for the development of legal doctrine and for
important trial outcome parameters, such as the plaintiff win rate. Using this definition,
trial selection theory can be said to have started with Priest and Klein (1984).
Trial selection theory is important for many reasons.

People often refer to

plaintiff win rates in an attempt to assess whether the law works as it should in certain
areas of litigation.1 Low plaintiff win rates are often cited as a sign that the law favors
defendants, and conversely. Trial selection theory is useful in any effort to draw reliable
inferences from trial outcome statistics.
Another reason trial selection theory is useful is that it helps us understand how
litigation influences the path of the law. If, for example, the most uncertain cases are the
ones that go to trial, then the law will not exhibit a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias
over time. If, on the other hand, the cases that go to trial tend to be those with facts that
favor defendants, then we will observe legal rules that exhibit a pro-defendant bias.
On a more confounding level, trial selection theory implies that legal analysts
have to read court decisions with care, in order to avoid confusing characteristics of the
sample of litigated cases with characteristics of all legal disputes. If the cases that make
it all the way to litigation form an unrepresentative sample of legal disputes, then certain
features of decided cases may be unreliable signals of the decision-making process of
courts.

For example, a legal analyst who observes that all of the cases in which

defendants are held negligent involve facts in which the reasonable level of precaution is
difficult to determine might draw the conclusion that courts find the negligence standard
difficult to apply, when in fact the easy-to-determine negligence cases never went all the
way to judgment.
The best known trial selection theory is the “divergent expectations” model of
Priest and Klein. According to the theory of Priest and Klein only the most uncertain
1

On the political uses of win rate data see, e.g., Daniels and Martin (1995).
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disputes (i.e., coin tosses) make it all the way to a court judgment, and as a result plaintiff
win rates tend toward fifty percent unless the parties have asymmetric stakes. The best
known alternative to the divergent expectations theory is the informational asymmetry
theory, which holds that plaintiff win rates will tend toward fifty percent only when
neither party has the informational advantage, and otherwise the win rate will be greater
for the informed party. However, the divergent expectations and asymmetric information
theories are by no means the only possible models of trial selection.2
Part II presents a review of the literature. Part III presents a general model that
includes Priest-Klein and asymmetric information theories as special cases. Part IV
discusses practical considerations in asymmetric information models of litigation. Part V
discusses empirical evidence on trial selection theory.

II. Literature Review

The trial selection literature consists of two parts. One consists of studies of the
economics of the settlement decision. The other consists of studies of the selection of
disputes for litigation and the implications of that process for important parameters such
as the rate of plaintiff victory.

A. The Settlement Decision

The foundation for much of the literature on the economics of settlement is the
Landes-Posner-Gould settlement model,3 which implies that settlement occurs when the
difference between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s predictions of the judgment
(divergence in expectations) is less than the total cost of litigation. The LPG model is
based on a rationality (or incentive compatibility) constraint on settlements: a settlement
has to be perceived by the plaintiff and by the defendant as improving his position
relative to litigation. The LPG condition is assumed to be both a necessary and sufficient

2
3

See, e.g., Eisenberg and Farber, and discussion inside.
See Landes (1971), Gould (1973), and Posner (1973).
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condition for settlement.

The model ignores questions of strategic behavior and

informational asymmetry.
Much of the literature examining the economics of settlement builds on the LPG
framework. Shavell (1982), setting out the most complete early formal analysis of the
litigation-settlement decision, suggests that litigation results from excessive optimism on
the part of plaintiffs and defendants.
The literature on the economics of settlement has been expanded significantly by
incorporating asymmetric information and strategic behavior.

The first article to

introduce strategic behavior and informational asymmetry was Png (1983), followed
closely by Bebchuk (1984). The informational asymmetry framework introduced in the
Png and Bebchuk articles assumed that the defendant has an informational advantage in
litigation. However, Png’s is a signaling model in which the informed defendant makes
the settlement offer, while Bebchuk’s is a screening model in which the uninformed
plaintiff makes a settlement demand. The asymmetric information models demonstrate
that there are cases litigated under conditions that would not lead to litigation in the LPG
model.
The asymmetric information literature of settlement has expanded significantly
since the Png and Bebchuk articles.
negotiations over stages.

Spier (1992) examines the path of settlement

Daughety and Reinganum (1993) present a model that

incorporates different informational advantage assumptions and examine the implications
for settlement and trial. Hay (1995) examines the influence of discovery on settlement
negotiations.

B. Selection Hypothesis or Effect

The second major strand of literature on the economics of trial selection is a set of
articles focusing on the selection hypothesis (or selection effect) introduced by Priest and
Klein (1984). The selection framework of Priest and Klein, assumes that parties in
litigation have symmetric information and does not explicitly incorporate strategic
behavior.

The Priest-Klein selection hypothesis holds that only the most uncertain

disputes go all the way to a judgment in litigation. The resulting win rate for plaintiffs is
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fifty percent, because trials are just as uncertain as coin tosses. If, on the other hand,
parties have asymmetric stakes, the plaintiff win rate may exceed or fall below fifty
percent under the Priest-Klein model.4 Priest and Klein introduced empirical evidence to
support their hypothesis. Eisenberg (1990) found significant deviations from the fifty
percent hypothesis.
The selection hypothesis literature, like the settlement literature generally, has
been expanded by the incorporation of strategic behavior and asymmetric information.
The first paper to consider the implications of asymmetric information for the selection
hypothesis was Hylton (1993). The second paper was Shavell (1996). Since the analysis
in Hylton was largely informal, the Shavell article introduces the first formal model of
the selection hypothesis in the context of informational asymmetry.
Hylton (1993) concluded that the Priest-Klein fifty-percent hypothesis was correct
in the informational symmetry setting, but that plaintiff win rates would deviate from
fifty percent in the information asymmetry setting.

Specifically, plaintiff win rates

should be less than (greater than) fifty percent when defendants (plaintiffs) have the
informational advantage in litigation.

Hylton argued that the empirical evidence

presented in Eisenberg (1990) on plaintiff win rates supports this hypothesis.
Shavell, building on the screening model of Bebchuk (1984), concluded that any
win rate percentage could be observed, and that there was no clear tendency for the
plaintiff win rate to be less than or greater than fifty percent in the context of
informational asymmetry. Shavell found that the differential settlement incentives tended
to depress plaintiff win rates when the defendant had the informational advantage, but
found no basis for concluding that the win rate in that setting would be less than fifty
percent.
Hylton (2002) presents an alternative model of the selection effect within the
informational asymmetry context.

The alternative model builds on the signaling

framework of Png (1987) to analyze the trial outcome parameters under informational
asymmetry. The signaling framework delivers results that differ from the screening

4

For an early critique of the Priest-Klein model, see Wittman (1985). Wittman found that in a more
general model there was no tendency toward a fifty percent win rate.
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framework employed by Shavell.

The results of the signaling model are generally

consistent with the informal analysis of Hylton (1993).
More recent literature has attempted to test Priest-Klein and asymmetric
information theories of the selection effect, as well as introduce additional theories.
Eisenberg and Farber (1996) introduce the litigious-plaintiff hypothesis, which holds that
win rates can be understood according to the plaintiff’s cost of litigation, which varies
more for individuals than for corporations. Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996) find that
the Priest-Klein model tends to be confirmed in settings that are consistent with its
assumptions (symmetric information and symmetric stakes), but that win rates deviate
from fifty percent under informational asymmetry and in other contexts. Waldfogel
(1998) finds that the empirical evidence supports the Priest-Klein model with deviations
from fifty-percent due to asymmetry in litigation stakes.

C. Overview

Many contributions to the trial selection literature do not distinguish the two
strands (settlement versus selection effects) identified in the foregoing discussion. Yet it
is important to distinguish the general models of litigation and settlement from the
models of the selection effect on trial outcomes.

Many of the general models of

settlement do not yield testable hypotheses concerning trial outcomes. In contrast, the
selection effects literature, beginning with Priest and Klein, aims to generate testable
predictions on important trial outcome parameters.
In particular, the asymmetric information models of settlement generate
substantial variation in their predictions. The signaling approach introduced in Png
(1983) and explored in Png (1987) yields different equilibrium outcomes than the
screening model introduced in Bebchuk (1984).

There is no single asymmetric

information model of settlement that produces a set of standard results. Given this, it
seems appropriate to either examine asymmetric information models in the context of
their particular assumptions, or to attempt to minimize the importance of the assumptions.
In the model below, we attempt the latter strategy by introducing uncertainty in the

6
litigants’ predictions.

The model below reconciles Priest-Klein and asymmetric

information hypotheses.

III. Model
A. Assumptions

In this part we will set up a simple model of trial selection, based on Hylton
(2006), that includes the Priest-Klein model as a special case. The first component of this
model is the Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) rationality condition. Under the LPG model,
parties choose to litigate rather than settle a dispute if and only if
(Pp – Pd) > γ

(1)

where Pp = plaintiff’s estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor, Pd =
defendant’s estimate of the probability of a verdict in plaintiff’s favor; γ = C/J, where C =
the sum of the plaintiff’s litigation cost (Cp) and the defendant’s litigation cost (Cd), and J
= the value of the judgment. We assume that the settlement cost is zero. If the LPG
litigation condition (1) holds, the set of mutually beneficial settlement agreements is
empty, so the parties choose to litigate.5
The second basic component of this model is the assumption that each party’s
predictions can be modeled as the sum of a rational estimate and an idiosyncratic error
term
Pp = P'p + εp

(2)

Pd = P'd + εd

(3)

If Ωp represents the information set of the plaintiff, and Ωd represents the information set
of the defendant, then P'p = E(Pp| Ωp) , P'd = E(Pd| Ωd), E(εp | Ωp) = 0, E(εd | Ωd) = 0.
5

For an asymmetric information model in which the LPG condition continues to determine litigation
outcomes, see Hylton (2002). By relying on the LPG framework, we are assuming that the nonexistence of
a mutually beneficial settlement is the main determinant of litigation.
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The third basic component of the model is a specification of the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s rational estimates of the probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Let
W = probability that the defendant in a legal dispute violated the legal standard. Let Q1 =
probability that a defendant who has violated the legal standard will be found innocent
(type-1 judicial error). Let Q2 = probability that a defendant who has not violated the
legal standard will be found guilty (type-2 judicial error). So that courts are at least as
accurate as coin tosses, we will assume that 1-Q1 > Q2. The plaintiff’s rational estimate
of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor can be expressed as a function of the compliance and
judicial-error probabilities:
P'p = Wp(1-Q1p) + (1-Wp)Q2p ,

(4)

where Wp = E(W| Ωp), Q1p = E(Q1| Ωp), Q2p = E(Q2| Ωp). Similarly, P'd = Wd(1-Q1d) + (1Wd)Q2d.
We focus on two types of information set immediately below. One is the case in
which the litigant has minimal case-specific information and forms a rational estimate of
the likelihood of a verdict on the plaintiff’s side using that minimal information. This is
the case of the uninformed litigant. The other is the case in which a litigant has private
information and knows whether the defendant complied with the legal standard. For
example, an uninformed malpractice plaintiff will know that he has been injured, but will
not know whether the injury is due to the defendant’s negligence.

An informed

malpractice defendant will know not only that he has injured the patient, but also whether
or not he was negligent.
In the case of the uninformed litigant, we will assume that his rational predictions
are accurate and equal to the true case-specific probabilities of compliance and of error
(given minimal case-specific information).

Thus, if the plaintiff is uninformed, his

prediction is the objective probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, i.e., P'p = W(1Q1) + (1-W)Q2. Similarly, if the defendant is uninformed P'd = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2. To
simplify, let us label the objective probability of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor
ν = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2

(5)

8

If one of the parties has private information on compliance, his estimate of W is equal to
1 in the case of non-compliance, or 0 in the case of compliance. Thus, to take one
example, if the defendant is informed and innocent, Pd = P'd = Q2.
The fourth component is a heteroscedasticity assumption regarding the error
variances of the predictions.6 From the perspective of a litigant, the outcome of a dispute
is most uncertain when the rational component of the litigants’ prediction is equal to ½.
This is the case in which the outcome of the dispute is viewed by the litigant as a coin
toss; the litigant may have a great deal of information on the case, but the sum total of his
information leads him to believe that a finding of guilt (or liability) is just as likely as a
finding of innocence (non-liability).

Consistent with Priest and Klein (1984), we

therefore assume that the variance of the prediction error term is a function of the rational
component of the litigant’s prediction, and that the variance reaches a maximum when
the rational component is ½ and with minima at 0 and 1 (see Figure 1 below).

σ p2 , σ d2

0

0.5

1

ν

Figure 1

6

Wittman (1985) emphasizes the importance of the heteroscedasticity assumption in the Priest-Klein
analysis.
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B. Frequency of Litigation

The probability of litigation is
f = prob((Pp–Pd) > γ)

(6)

which, given (2) and (3), is
f = prob ( ε p − ε d > γ − Δ ) ,

(7)

where Δ = P'p – P'd. We assume that the error difference εp – εd is generated by a
truncated normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ, where εp – εd ∈
[–1–Δ, 1–Δ]. The variance of the error difference can be decomposed σ2 = σ2p + σ2d – 2ρ.
Based on the foregoing, the frequency of litigation is given by
f=1–G

(8)

where G, which is the probability of settlement, is

G (γ − Δ; −1 − Δ,1 − Δ ) =

Φ(

γ −Δ
−1 − Δ
) − Φ(
)
σ
σ
.

−1 − Δ
1− Δ
Φ(
) − Φ(
)

σ

(9)

σ

The heteroscedasticity assumption implies that as the degree of uncertainty
concerning the judgment increases (as reflected in the variance terms in the
denominator), the probability of litigation rises (Priest and Klein, 1984).7
The frequency of litigation function combines features from several models of the
litigation process. Note that as the cost of litigation rises relative to the judgment – i.e.,
7

This result is in Hylton (2006) but is based on a non-truncated normal, which is technically inappropriate.
The same result holds for the truncated case, but the proof is complicated; we have explored it in a separate
paper (in progress).

10
as γ increases – the probability of litigation falls, a prediction of the Landes-PosnerGould framework. The Priest-Klein model is also incorporated by the assumption of
heteroscedastic prediction-error variances.

Over-optimism appears as a factor that

generates litigation (Shavell, 1982). Over-optimism is incorporated in the model by
assuming a negative correlation between prediction errors, which reduces σ (because σ2 =
σ2p + σ2d – 2ρ). When the correlation between the parties’ prediction errors is negative,
plaintiffs overestimate the size of the judgment while defendants underestimate the size
of the judgment.

1. Priest-Klein Case

Under the Priest-Klein analysis, litigation is driven by uncertainty and the plaintiff
win rate equals 50 percent. The reason is that only disputes that are as uncertain as coin
tosses make it all the way to judgment.
The frequency of litigation function f can generate the analysis of Priest and Klein
when the rational predictions of the plaintiff and the defendant are the same (P'p = P'd, or
Δ = 0). In this case, the key factor leading to litigation is uncertainty, as reflected in the
error variance in the denominator of (9). The Priest-Klein model assumes uncertainty
regarding trial-outcome predictions increases as the defendant’s conduct comes closer to
the legal standard, which implies that the rational component of the trial-outcome
prediction is 50 percent (P'p = P'd = ½).
A precise description of the Priest-Klein theorem within the context of this model
can be achieved by examining the plaintiff’s win rate. The average plaintiff win rate
takes into account the frequency of litigation, which is a function of the probability of
litigation conditional on v (the f function) and the distribution of v. If the distribution of v
is uniform, this can be expressed as:

1

π = ∫ vf (v)dv
0

(10)
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Given the assumptions on the error variances (see Figure 1), f is symmetric around v = ½.
Under these assumptions π = ½.8

2. Asymmetric Information Case

There are two asymmetric information cases to consider: where the defendant has
the informational advantage and where the plaintiff has the informational advantage.
When the defendant has the informational advantage, the frequency of litigation
will depend on the defendant’s type. If the plaintiff is uninformed and the defendant is
innocent, P'p = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2, P'd = Q2. Thus, ΔI = W(1-Q1-Q2). Let fI be the
probability of litigation evaluated at ΔI. If the defendant is guilty, P'p = W(1-Q1) + (1W)Q2, P'd = 1-Q1, and ΔG = – (1-W)(1-Q1-Q2). Let fG be the probability of litigation
evaluated ΔG.

In the nontruncated normal case examined in Hylton (2006), it is

immediately clear that the frequency of litigation is larger for cases involving innocent
defendants, i.e., fI > fG. In the truncated case, the same result holds in most cases.9 This
is because guilty defendants settle their cases at a higher rate than the innocent.
The average win rate, when the defendant has the informational advantage, is

1

π 2 = ∫ [Wf G (1 − Q1) + (1 − W ) f I Q2]dv

(11)

0

Because the frequency of litigation is greater for innocent defendants, the average win
rate expression implies that instead of a tendency toward 50 percent, the average win rate
when the defendant has the informational advantage will tend toward some level less than
50 percent, i.e., π 2 < π .
Now suppose the plaintiff has the informational advantage. There are two cases
to consider: when the plaintiff deserves to win (meritorious plaintiff), and when the
plaintiff deserves to lose (non-meritorious plaintiff). In the non-meritorious case, the
8

For a sketch of this special case, see Hylton (2006), but the argument is incomplete and the more general
problem of ascertaining the conditions under which the Priest-Klein result holds is not examined in that
paper. We examine the Priest-Klein model in a more general setting in a separate paper in progress.
9
The proofs have been omitted from this paper, and are presented in a separate paper.
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plaintiff brings a claim that deserves to be called frivolous. The plaintiff brings it
because he knows that with probability Q2 he will be awarded damages by the court.
In the meritorious plaintiff case, the probability of litigation fI where ΔI = (1-W)(1Q1-Q2). In the non-meritorious case the probability of litigation is fG where ΔG = –W(1Q1-Q2). The pairing between the uninformed defendant and the informed and meritorious
(innocent) plaintiff is more likely to litigate than that of the frivolous (guilty) plaintiff.
The reason is that the guilty plaintiff tends to settle his claim. This leads to high win
rates, exceeding fifty percent.
The foregoing analysis can be summarized in the form of a simple proposition
offered in Hylton (1993):
Divergent Expectations/Asymmetric Information Selection Hypothesis: If neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant has the informational advantage in litigation, the plaintiff
win rate will tend toward fifty percent. If the defendant (plaintiff) has the informational
advantage, the plaintiff win rate will be less than (greater than) fifty percent.
This proposition provides a general selection theory based on the parties’
possession of information relevant to the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. The
Priest-Klein hypothesis is a special case that holds in the absence of a substantial
informational disparity.

IV. Strategic Behavior Models of Litigation: Some Practical Considerations

As we noted at the outset, the signaling and screening approaches in the literature
have generated different implications in the models analyzing the selection effect. The
screening model generates no clear implication with respect to the level of the plaintiff
win rate (Shavell, 1996). The signaling model, however, generates results more in line
with the view that informational asymmetry leads to predictable deviations from the fifty
percent plaintiff win rate prediction. Neither approach clearly yields the Priest-Klein
model’s fifty percent prediction – though the prediction is consistent with the signaling
model.

The model presented in the previous section has the desirable feature of

generating the Priest-Klein prediction and also including the asymmetric information
models as special cases.
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The success of the foregoing model in delivering the Priest-Klein prediction raises
the question whether the screening approach is preferable to the signaling model in the
analysis of selection effects. There are good reasons to prefer either the signaling model
or a different version of the screening model than that used in the analysis of litigation
outcomes.
First, if one considers the nature of litigation as a transaction, it seems intuitive
that the signaling model should be preferred to the screening model.10 The screening
model is especially appropriate in the case of an uninformed actor that must set a contract
term for many informed actors on the other side of the contact: e.g., an insurer setting
terms for uninsured (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), a bank setting the interest rate on a
loan (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), an employer setting the wage, or an airline setting the
price of a plane ticket. In these settings, the uninformed actor can be said to have acted
first, and is more or less forced by the circumstances to choose the contract term without
being able to observe signals that would allow him to sort the contracting parties by type.
The screening model provides a useful description of the informed actor’s incentives, and
the general characteristics of the market equilibrium.
In the litigation context, there is no plausible sense in which the plaintiff or the
defendant acts first, or is forced by the circumstances to choose a contract term
(settlement offer) before observing any signals identifying the type of the other party.
When the plaintiff makes a settlement demand, he is not setting a price for some faceless
mass of counterparties; settlement involves a one-on-one bargaining relationship. The
plaintiff can and typically does observe some signals from the defendant that would lead
him to update his beliefs about the defendant’s guilt. While the screening model is well
suited to the scenarios in which it was originally applied, its appropriateness in the case
of litigation is questionable.
One argument in favor of the screening model is that it leads to simple outcomes.
The screening models, in contrast, generate complicated results with more than one
equilibrium outcome.11 However, the simplicity advantage of the screening model has to
10

In a general assessment of signaling and screening models, Stiglitz and Weiss (1994) conclude that
history and knowledge of the particular setting should inform decisions on the type of asymmetric
information model.
11
Stiglitz and Weiss (1994).
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be balanced against the cost of using such a model in the litigation setting. The screening
model delivers general statements that offer a broad brush view of the outcome (e.g.,
litigation will occur), but it does not offer specific testable predictions that are useful in
the analysis of selection effects in litigation.

V. Empirical Evidence

In this part we examine the empirical evidence on trial selection theory. Before
examining the evidence, a few preliminary points are in order.
First, although trial selection theories are distinguishable from models of
settlement, there is a close connection between the two. The divergent expectations
(Priest-Klein) and asymmetric information selection theories are, as the model in the
previous part shows, derivable from settlement models.
Indeed, one could generate a selection theory based on any particular variable that
plays a role in the settlement decision. In settlement models, such as the LPG framework
[(Pp – Pd) > γ], the settlement decision is influenced by several major factors: the parties’
predictions of the outcome of trial, the expected judgment, and the litigation costs borne
by the parties. Each of these factors imparts some influence on the decision to go to trial.
It follows that each of these factors also imparts some influence on the rate at which
plaintiffs win at the trial level. The litigious-plaintiff hypothesis of Eisenberg and Farber
employs variation in the parties’ costs of litigation to generate a theory of trial selection
(see also Langlais, Chopard, and Cortade, 2008). One could also use the variation in the
plaintiff’s award to generate a theory of selection (Miceli, 2009).
What distinguishes the Priest-Klein and asymmetric information theories is that
they focus on the parties’ trial outcome expectations and generate testable predictions on
key trial outcome parameters.

The best example is the Priest-Klein model, which

generates a prediction that plaintiffs will win fifty percent of trials (unless stakes are
asymmetric).

Theories of selection based on variation in litigation costs or in the
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expected judgment are unlikely to generate equivalently strong testable predictions on the
key trial outcome parameters.12
The other preliminary point worth noting is that the divergent expectations and
asymmetric information models apply across a broad spectrum of hypotheses concerning
factors that might influence trial outcomes. Suppose, for example, that one hypothesizes
that trial judges are biased in favor of plaintiffs.13 Under the Priest-Klein model, that
should not lead to a prediction of a higher win rate for plaintiffs, as long as the bias is
public information. If the bias is public information, both plaintiffs and defendant will
take it into account in settlement discussions, and the fifty percent win rate prediction
will still be observed. Other than asymmetric stakes, only unexpected shocks – say, an
unannounced change in the decision standard – will cause the plaintiff win rate to deviate
from its fifty percent tendency.
Similarly, informational asymmetry could be present in many different forms
relevant to litigation. The common assumption is that the defendant knows more about
the facts of his own compliance with the legal standard than does the plaintiff (Png, 1983;
Bebchuk, 1984). But either party could have an informational advantage with respect to
some variable that influences the trial outcome. Consider possible judicial biases. If the
plaintiff has private information with respect to the bias of a particular judge, that
information will influence the plaintiff’s settlement conduct and impart an upward
influence on plaintiff win rates (Hylton, 2006).
Asymmetric information theories could operate on a wide array of variables
influencing the trial outcome and could be consistent with a wide array of trial outcome
parameters (win rate, trial rate, etc).

The defendant could have an informational

advantage with respect to the facts of the case, while the plaintiff could have an
informational advantage with respect to judicial biases. If the informational advantages
are roughly the same on both sides, the conditions could be equivalent to the equal
information assumption of Priest-Klein. If the advantages are not the same, then an
analyst would have to assess whether the effect of one type of informational advantage
12

For example, the litigious-plaintiff hypothesis of Eisenberg and Farber (1997) generates the prediction
that on average individual plaintiffs will win less than corporate plaintiffs, but this offers no prediction on
the win rate level.
13
See, e.g., Eisenberg and Heise (2009), at 125.
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dominates. An empirical test would have to start by specifying the variable with respect
to which information is asymmetric, and a prediction of the selective effect that variable
will have as a result of informational asymmetry.

A. Win Rate Observations

There are now several studies that present win rate patterns across several case
categories (property, torts, malpractice, etc). These studies allow researchers to examine
win rate evidence directly to check for consistency with a particular selection theory.
Deviations from fifty percent can be explained under the Priest-Klein theory by
asymmetric stakes. Alternatively, deviations from fifty percent can be explained by the
asymmetric information model.

1. Across case categories

Hylton (1993) argues that win rates tended in general to conform with the PriestKlein prediction but that substantial deviations were observed in pockets in which one
party was likely to have a significant informational advantage. The most obvious pockets
are medical malpractice and product liability litigation, where defendants are likely to
have a significant advantage with respect to information on their own compliance with
the legal standard.

Win rates for medical malpractice and products liability are

consistently less than fifty percent (Eisenberg, 1990). Products liability is governed
largely by the “risk-utility” standard, which is a type of negligence test that focuses on
the incremental risk and incremental utility presented by the defendant’s design in
comparison with a safer alternative. The standard gives the defendant an informational
advantage over the plaintiff. Similarly, the negligence standard for medical malpractice,
which is based on the doctor’s compliance with medical custom, gives the doctor an
informational advantage over the plaintiff.
Win rates for contract actions tend to be greater than those for tort actions
(Eisenberg, 1990, p.357). This is consistent with the asymmetric information theory.
Tort actions often involve defendants with private information on their own compliance
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with the legal standard. Contract actions, in comparison, generally look at the conduct of
both parties in relation to objective rules governing offer and acceptance.

Since

defendant-side informational advantage is more common in the tort setting, lower
plaintiff win rates are predicted under the informational asymmetry model.

The

asymmetric stakes theory, on the other hand, could explain this pattern only if plaintiffs
generally have greater stakes in contract than in tort actions.

2. Within case categories

Even within the products liability category, win rate patterns appear to be
consistent with the asymmetric information theory. When the plaintiffs bring products
liability claims based on contract – e.g., a claim that the product failed to perform as
warranted – plaintiff win rates tend to be greater than fifty percent.14 Products liability
claims based on tort law tend have win rates less than fifty percent (Eisenberg 1990).
The asymmetric information model suggests that the key difference between productliability contract and product-liability tort actions is that the defendant does not have an
informational advantage under the legal standard used in the contract actions (Hylton,
2006).15 In contrast to the asymmetric information theory, the stakes theory fails to
explain the pattern of win rates observed within the products liability category.

If

defendants have greater stakes in these cases, as the stakes theory posits, they should tend
to win more often than plaintiffs both in product-liability tort actions and in productliability contract actions. However, one observes the opposite in the case of productliability contract actions.

B. Other Observations of Trial Outcome Parameters and More Sophisticated Tests
14

Eisenberg (1990) reports .57 in the case of contract-based actions, .25 for tort-based actions.
Those standards come in essentially two varieties: express and implied warranty rules. Express
warranties are simply the terms of the contract, and there is no reason to believe that either party has an
informational advantage in reading the contract. However, contract law doctrines generally favor the
consumer in these cases. Since state courts are rather idiosyncratic in this regard, it is quite possible that
lawyers on the plaintiff’s side, who are more likely than the product seller’s lawyers to be familiar with the
law and the behavior of juries in their jurisdiction, generally have the best prediction of the effective legal
standard. In the case of implied warranties, the court’s determination of a contract breach will often depend
on the type of use to which the consumer put the product. In these cases, the plaintiff-consumer is again
likely to have an informational advantage.

15
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Several recent studies have examined other trial outcome parameters or conducted
more sophisticated tests of selection theories.
Waldfogel (1998) presents an empirical model that attempts to test the degree to
which the divergent expectations and asymmetric information theories are consistent with
data on trial outcomes. The study concludes that the evidence is consistent with the
divergent expectations theory but not with the asymmetric information theory.
The core empirical test in the Waldfogel article involves an examination of the
correlation between trial rates and the plaintiff win rate.

He argues, based on the

Bebchuk model, that the asymmetric information theory implies a positive relationship
between the trial rate and the plaintiff win rate, and a positive relationship between the
plaintiff win rate and the size of the award. He finds evidence of a negative relationship
in both cases and concludes that the asymmetric information model is rejected.
The usefulness of the empirical strategy of Waldfogel depends on the extent to
which the screening model (Bebchuk model) serves as a complete account of the
asymmetric information theory. However, the screening model, we have argued, does
not serve as a complete account of the asymmetric information theory. Indeed, given the
strong incentives for and low cost of signaling in the litigation context, the screening
provides a rather incomplete account of the asymmetric information theory. Hence,
Waldfogel’s approach should be regarded as inconclusive because it rejects an
incomplete version of the asymmetric information theory.
Eisenberg and Heise (2009) present evidence that defendants appear to win at the
appellate level more frequently than do plaintiffs. The “defendant advantage” result
appears at first glance to be inconsistent with trial selection theories. The evidence of a
defendant advantage appears to hold for several categories of litigation. The defendant
advantage result appears to be inexplicable on the basis of the Priest-Klein model.
Moreover, the nearly uniform result appears to be inconsistent with the informational
asymmetry theory, since that theory would imply variation according to case category.
On closer inspection, the defendant advantage result does not appear to be
inconsistent with trial selection theories. Trial and appellate courts have different areas
of competence; with trial courts resolving factual issues and appellate courts resolving
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issues of law. Given these differences, it is not difficult to see how a settlement process
that produces Priest-Klein results at the trial level might still generate the appearance of a
defendant advantage at the appellate level.
Other things equal, plaintiffs will tend to push forward at the trial level with cases
that they perceive as strong on factual grounds (e.g., sympathetic plaintiff), even if they
are weak on legal grounds. Such a strategy would be successful for plaintiffs in the vast
majority of cases in which it is employed, because relatively few defendants will have an
incentive to appeal a trial court decision. Of the cases that are generated from this
particular process, defendants will gain an advantage at the appellate level precisely
because the appellate court will focus on the law rather than the particular facts of the
case.
In some respects, this theory is supported by the data presented in the Eisenberg
and Heise article. The defendant advantage result is particularly strong for torts cases,
which generally comply with the Priest-Klein hypothesis at the trial level. Thus, at the
trial level, the Priest-Klein hypothesis is confirmed, while at the appellate level, the
“defendant advantage” hypothesis is confirmed. In case categories where informational
asymmetry is present, such as medical malpractice and products liability, Eisenberg and
Heise find no evidence of a defendant advantage. This suggests that appeals from
medical malpractice and products liability cases tend to be based on law, with respect to
which neither party has an informational advantage. Trial court decisions in these areas
reflect the superior information of defendants. Appellate decisions fail to reflect or to be
suggestive of any informational advantage for either side.
Moreover, the defendant advantage result reported by Eisenberg and Heise is
particularly strong for jury trials, which suggests that plaintiffs are assuming that
sympathetic facts will give them the strongest chances in front of juries.16 The defendant
advantage hypothesis receives weak confirmation at best in the case of bench trials.17
Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996) use a multimodal empirical examination of the
selection hypothesis.

Specifically, they estimate a regression model that includes

variables that they argue should explain deviations from the fifty percent win rate

16
17

Eisenberg and Heise, at 142
Id.
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prediction.

Their results are consistent with both the divergent expectations and

asymmetric information hypotheses.
The difficult part of such a study is the creation of variables that effectively
distinguish the effects of various selection influences. Among the selection influences
included in the regression model of Kessler, Meites, and Miller are informational
asymmetry, stakes asymmetry, and biased legal standards. These three influences are
difficult to distinguish.

For example, Kessler, Meites, and Miller describe medical

malpractice as an area in which stakes are asymmetric.18 However, medical malpractice
is clearly a category in which informational asymmetry favors defendants. It is unclear,
in their framework, which coding approach would be correct for the medical malpractice
category.19 Given that three of the variables in their model (information asymmetry,
stakes asymmetry, and biased standard) are at least partially measuring informational
asymmetry, their results can be read as providing empirical confirmation for the
combined divergent expectations/information asymmetry proposition presented in the
conclusion of the theory discussion in this paper.20
Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) present an alternative multimodal regression
approach to selection theory. They focus on three determinants of litigation identified in
the Priest-Klein model: the decision standard, the variance in the parties’ predictions of
the decision standard, and the asymmetry of stakes. They also estimate a second model
that includes a proxy for the asymmetry in variance predictions (asymmetric uncertainty).
They find that the four parameter model performs better in explaining the win rate and
the trial rate than does the three parameter model.
The Siegelman and Waldfogel results are broadly consistent with those of
Kessler, Meites, and Miller. Their inclusion of an asymmetric uncertainty measure
should be viewed as an attempt to include a proxy for informational asymmetry. In
addition, some of the observations that they code for asymmetric stakes could probably

18

Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996), at 242.
Hylton (1993) confronts the same problem, but argues that the data are more consistent overall with the
asymmetric information hypothesis than with the differential stakes hypothesis.
20
The same problem is present in Eisenberg and Farber (1997). The litigious plaintiff hypothesis is
confirmed by finding that plaintiff win rates are lower when the plaintiff is an individual. But case in
which the plaintiff is an individual will overlap considerably with cases in which the defendant has an
informational advantage.
19
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be coded more accurately as informational asymmetry. The results should be interpreted
as confirming the divergent expectation/asymmetric information theory.

V. Conclusion

If this review has appeared at times to argue in favor of a simple and bold
statement of the selection hypothesis, that is by design. Priest and Klein offered a spare
model with a bold and falsifiable proposition: plaintiff win rates should tend toward fifty
percent unless the litigating parties have asymmetric stakes. Some of the more recent
contributions, however, have stated the Priest-Klein theory (or divergent expectations
selection theory) in a weaker form, weighted down with qualifications, perhaps in order
to avoid rejecting it. Selection theory is better advanced, in our view, through the bold
statement approach of the Priest-Klein article.
The asymmetric information selection theory holds that win rates will tend toward
fifty percent unless one of the parties has the informational advantage, in which case the
win rate will be higher for the side with the advantage. We have presented a simple
model that communicates the asymmetric information theory, and shows its connection to
the divergent expectations model.
These two theories do not exhaust the realm of potential trial selection theories.
As we noted earlier, a selection theory can be based on expectations, the amount at stake,
or the costs of litigation. The distinguishing feature of the divergent expectations and
asymmetric information theories is that they deliver clear predictions on important trial
outcome parameters, and for the path through which common law rules evolve (Priest
1980, Priest and Klein (1984), Hylton 2006).
As the selection literature has expanded, empirical tests have been employed to
distinguish the importance of divergent expectations and asymmetric information as
determinants of trial outcomes statistics. Although the results of the empirical tests
appear to confirm both theories to some extent, the empirical work so far has to be
considered preliminary.

The main difficulties are: (1) attempting to construct an

empirical framework that embodies a richer model of information-based selection, and
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(2) coding variables that distinguish information from other influences (e.g., stakes
asymmetry).
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